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Canada's Fiduciary Obligation
to Aboriginal Peoples
in the Context of Accession to Sovereignty
by Quebec
DOMESTIC DIMENSIONS
by Renée Dupuis
and
Kent McNeil

INTRODUCTION (Dupuis)
Consistent with the terms of reference set by the Royal Commission, this paper analyzes
the Crown's fiduciary obligations from the perspective of Canadian domestic law in the context
of accession to sovereignty by Quebec. We begin by defining a few elements essential to
establishing the context for this study. The first part of the paper focuses on the sources of the
Crown's fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada ─ and, in particular, to
Aboriginal peoples in Quebec ─ under current constitutional arrangements. The second part
deals with the general nature of the obligations, concentrating on an analysis of the obligations
with respect to the right of Aboriginal self-government and Aboriginal land rights. The final part
examines the scope of the fiduciary obligations based on a number of assumptions about an
accession to sovereignty by Quebec.
Fiduciary Relationships
It is now well established that there is a fiduciary relationship between the federal Crown
and the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.i This relationship is fiduciary or trust-like rather than
adversarial in nature.ii However, not every aspect of the relationship between fiduciary and
beneficiary takes the form of a fiduciary obligation.iii It is the nature of the relationship between
the parties, not their status, that defines the scope and the limits of the obligations it imposes.
The fiduciary relationship results in part from the concept of Native, Aboriginal or Indian
title.iv The government has a responsibility to protect the interests of Indian peoples because of
the special fiduciary relationship created by history, treaties and legislation.v Under certain
conditions, this sui generis relationship results in fiduciary obligations that impose limits on the

exercise of sovereign power.vi
The distinctive feature of a fiduciary relationship lies in the fact that the parties find
themselves in a legal situation where one party is at the mercy of the unilateral exercise, by the
other party, of a discretionary power that can affect the beneficiary's legal or practical
interests.vii
Fiduciary obligations are obligations in equity that are enforceable in law. The existence
of this obligation is mainly a question of fact, and a breach of it will give rise to a claim for
relief.viii Strictly speaking, this obligation is not a public law obligation or a private law trust.ix
A fiduciary obligation can be created in the context of both unilateral actions by the
Crown (legislative, administrative or other) and bilateral actions (treaties and other agreements).
Although it may be possible for the Crown to terminate a fiduciary obligation by way of an
agreement with Aboriginal peoples, it cannot do so unilaterally.

A New Paradigm
The recent recognition of the fiduciary relationship by Canadian courts requires us to
examine the historical relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples in this new light.
Earlier historical and legal research does not reflect this new perspective.
We cannot, in the context of this paper, provide a complete picture of the concept of the
Crown's fiduciary obligations. First, recognition of the concept of legally enforceable fiduciary
obligations is a major change in the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of the Crown's
obligations to Aboriginal peoples. It is therefore too soon to assess all the effects of this
recognition. Second, this change will oblige legal experts and others to re-examine historical
documents and government actions in light of this new legal reality. Finally, our mandate is
limited to examining the federal Crown's fiduciary obligations in the context of Quebec's
accession to sovereignty. We have therefore confined ourselves to this topic, although we are
aware that it does not cover the entire scope ─ real or potential ─ of these obligations. For
example, relocations of Inuit from northern Quebec to the high Arctic in the 1950s could involve
the federal government's fiduciary obligations. The relocations and the conditions under which
they were carried out could constitute a breach of the federal government's fiduciary obligations
to the relocated Inuit, particularly given its exclusive constitutional jurisdiction over them.
However, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.

Varied Scope
The federal Crown's fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples are by nature the same
throughout Canada. The extent and scope of the obligations are not identical, however, with
respect to all Aboriginal peoples or in all parts of Canada. We will see, for example, that one
source of a fiduciary obligation applies only to Indian peoples. Another source applies only to
Aboriginal peoples within a given area, such as Quebec or Ontario. Finally, another source
applies to all Aboriginal peoples, including Indian peoples, Inuit and Métis people.
American and Canadian Precedents
The Supreme Court of Canada's first decision on the Crown's fiduciary obligations,
Guerin, was rendered a year after the 1983 judgement of the United States Supreme Court in
Mitchell II.x In Mitchell II, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time awarded damages for a
breach of fiduciary obligation by the U.S. government. The Court held that there is a fiduciary
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes that creates a fiduciary obligation on the
part of the government, thus obliging it to compensate the Indians if they prove the obligation
was breached. The similarity between the facts in Mitchell and those in Guerin, and between the
judgements of the supreme court of each country, is striking. This was not a unique occurrence,
however, as the Supreme Court of Canada has sometimes referred to historical decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court on Aboriginal issues and continues to do so.
PART I
The Fiduciary Obligation
Major Sources in Canadian Law (Dupuis/McNeil)
Since Canadian courts have recognized only recently that the federal Crown has fiduciary
obligations to Aboriginal peoples, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of the sources of
the obligations. Moreover, insufficient time has passed to allow us to identify definitive
principles regarding the obligations. The few authoritative statements that exist need to be
clarified, leading to a better delimitation of the concept of fiduciary obligations over the next few
decades. The scope of the sources of the obligations will then be better defined.
The principles we identify in this paper must therefore not be taken as settled. The

passage of time will help determine the legal consequences of recognizing the federal Crown's
fiduciary obligations, and we can anticipate that Parliament and the courts will try to delineate
them.
The same is true of the sources of the obligations. We undertook our analysis in this
spirit. We do not claim to provide an exhaustive list of sources or to establish definitive
categories of sources. The hierarchy among the various sources of the obligations has not yet
been established; it is therefore difficult at this stage to group them in well defined categories.
We referred to the following sources: the Canadian constitution, historical and
present-day legislation and regulations, court decisions, and treaties (pre- and
post-Confederation) between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples.xi
Since the fiduciary obligations are based on the historical relationship between the Crown
and Aboriginal peoples, in presenting the sources we have roughly followed the evolution of
legal regimes in Canada, starting with the establishment of ties between Europeans and
Aboriginal peoples. The paper is limited to identifying some of the sources of the Crown's
fiduciary obligations; a more thorough analysis of each source, though needed, is beyond the
scope of the paper. Although our study concerned the federal Crown's fiduciary obligations in the
context of Quebec's accession to sovereignty, most of the sources identified do not apply only to
Quebec.
For purposes of the paper, we identified nine sources that could create fiduciary
obligations to Aboriginal peoples in Quebec on the part of the federal Crown: (1) the Treaty of
Utrecht (1713); (2) the Capitulation of Montreal (1760); (3) the Royal Proclamation of 1763; (4)
historical treaties; (5) section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867; (6) the Rupert's Land and the
North-Western Territory Order (1870) and the Joint Address of the Parliament of Canada (1869);
(7) legislation concerning Quebec's boundaries (1898 and 1912); (8) the James Bay and Northern
Quebec Agreement and the relevant implementing legislation; and (9) the Constitution Act, 1982.
Other sources of fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples, such as the Indian Act, are not
discussed directly.
The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) (Dupuis)
Although not previously considered in this light, the Treaty of Utrecht could represent an
expression of the historical relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples that is the

basis for fiduciary obligations.
Signed on 16 April 1713, the treaty ended the War of Spanish Succession. In the treaty
France restored to Great Britain "the bay and straits, of Hudson, together with all lands, seas, sea
coasts, rivers, and places situate in the said bay and straits, and which belong thereunto" (article
x). Great Britain and France then agreed to name "commissaries" who were to determine the
limits between Hudson Bay and the places belonging to France.
France also surrendered Acadia, with its ancient boundaries, as well as the island of
Newfoundland with the adjacent islands, except Cape Breton and the other islands in the mouth
and gulf of the St. Lawrence (articles xii and xiii).
Article XV of the treaty provides as follows:
The subjects of France inhabiting Canada and others shall hereafter give no
hindrance or molestation to the 5 nations or cantons of Indians, subject to the
dominion of Great Britain, nor to the other natives of America, who are friends to
the same. In like manner the subjects of Great Britain shall behave themselves
peaceably towards the Americans, who are subjects or friends to France... But it is
to be exactly and distinctly settled by Commissaries, who are and who ought to be
accounted the subjects and friends of Britain or of France.xii
On 30 April 1713, in a letter sent a few days after the Treaty of Utrecht was signed, the
French minister of the navy, the Comte de Pontchartrain, urged the governor of New France,
Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, to find the means to persuade the habitants and Indians of
Acadia to withdraw to Cape Breton, since the provisions of the Treaty of 1713 gave the subjects
of His Majesty the possibility of withdrawing from those colonies that were to be transferred or
restored to the British.
Since I am convinced that the habitants of Acadia will not have sworn an oath to
the Queen of England, they may withdraw under the terms agreed upon, without
the English being able to prevent them and I do not doubt that they will gladly
take the opportunity to move to Cape Breton. It is necessary that you seek the
means to persuade them to do so, as well as the Indians of Acadia.xiii [translation]
Article XV of this treaty between France and Great Britain could be interpreted as one of
the first formal expressions, in an international treaty, of the Aboriginal peoples' special status for
both the French and British, in relation to their respective claims to sovereignty over these lands.
It is also interesting to note that both sides refer to two types of Aboriginal nations: friends, and
subjects of the Crown.
This special status is the result of the factual, if not legal, position occupied historically
by Aboriginal peoples in Canada. At the time, the Europeans needed alliances with Aboriginal

peoples to establish their own sovereignty in North America. This position was the mainspring of
the special historical relationship of successive Crowns with Aboriginal peoples. The Crown's
fiduciary obligations are a product of this historical relationship.
The Treaty of Utrecht was concluded 50 years before the Royal Proclamation of 1763,
which restates some of its terms. It is thus possible to conclude that article XV of the treaty
constitutes, if not a direct source of fiduciary obligations, at least a formal expression of the
special historical relationship that gives rise to the federal Crown's fiduciary obligations.
The Articles of Capitulation of Montreal (1760) (Dupuis)
The Articles of Capitulation of Montreal, signed on 8 September 1760, confirmed the
victory of Great Britain over France in Canada. They were preceded one year earlier by the
Capitulation of Quebec, which followed the victory of the British army over the French army at
the Battle of the Plains of Abraham. The Articles of Capitulation of Quebec, signed on 18
September 1759, gave the British control over Quebec City and the surrounding region; the 11
articles make no specific mention of Aboriginal peoples.
The Capitulation of Montreal marked the definitive defeat of France in North America,
confirmed in the Treaty of Paris of 10 February 1763.
The Articles of Capitulation of Montreal ─ signed by General Amherst, commander in
chief of the British troops, and the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the French governor of Canada ─
contain 55 articles expressing the conditions negotiated by the French and accepted by the
British.xiv
Articles 9, 40 and 51 deal with the "Indians". First, the British refused to undertake to
send home Indians who had been members of their army, since they felt that these Aboriginal
troops had not behaved cruelly toward the French.
Then, article 40 grants the request of the French that the Indians who were allies of
France "be maintained in the lands they occupy if they wish to remain there; they shall not be
disturbed on any pretext whatever for having taken arms and served France". Provision is also
made to ensure that, like the French, they had freedom of religion (Catholic) and could keep their
missionaries.
Finally, General Amherst agreed, in article 51, to ensure that the Indians, if any remained
there after the surrender of Montreal, would not molest the French.

Speculation on the scope of article 40 continues to this day. Does it have the effect of
creating rights, perpetuating rights recognized earlier by the French, or recognizing and affirming
pre-existing rights? In the Sioui decision (1990), the Supreme Court of Canada answered this
question in part. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Lamer was of the opinion that
the article can only be interpreted as a condition on which the French agreed to
capitulate... Further I think it is clear that the purpose of art. 40 was to assure the Indians
of certain rights, not to extinguish existing rights.xv
Article 40 of the Articles of Capitulation of Montreal appears to contain at least an
undertaking by Great Britain not to dispossess Indians who had been allies of the French of the
lands they occupied in 1760. Does this undertaking, which applied beyond both the historical and
the present-day boundaries of Quebec, create an obligation on the part of the British Crown to
the Aboriginal peoples who were allies of France? Is this obligation a fiduciary one? If so, is it a
general obligation to protect the Aboriginal peoples or a specific fiduciary obligation? Which
peoples are the former Aboriginal allies of France to whom the obligation is owed? According to
the Supreme Court of Canada in Sioui, the Hurons at least were not in this category, because they
gave up their alliance with France at the time of the capitulation of Montreal, as we will see in
our examination of the Murray treaty (1760). Would the obligation give Aboriginal peoples
recourse if the Crown breached it? These questions are all unresolved and merit an analysis that
is beyond the scope of this paper.
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 (Dupuis)
The Treaty of Paris, signed on 10 February 1763, officially confirmed France's
recognition of British conquest of its possessions in North America.
The end of an era, the beginning of an era: such is the significance of the year 1763... the
proclamation is one of the important state papers of the 18th century. It stands at the
beginning of that new era, which was to see the reorganization of Canada under the new
government, the separation of the American colonies from the mother country, the
occupation of the west by Anglo-Saxons.xvi
This treaty of peace and alliance between Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal
ended the Seven Years War. Among other treaty provisions, France renounced its claim to the
whole of Acadia, Cape Breton and Canada. Practically nothing remained of its empire in North
America, since it had already ceded Louisiana to Spain.

Article 4 of the treaty defines the nature and extent of this surrender by France, which
cedes and guaranties to his said Britannick Majesty, in full right, Canada, with all its
dependencies...with the sovereignty, property, possession, and all rights acquired by
treaty, or otherwise, which the Most Christian King and the Crown of France have had till
now over the said countries, lands, islands, places, coasts and their inhabitants, so that the
Most Christian King cedes and makes over to the said King and to the Crown of Great
Britain, and that in the most ample manner and form, without restriction...xvii
The pressure exerted by Indian peoples, especially Pontiac's uprising against British
authorities, appears to have led King George III to issue an edict concerning the organization of
civil government in his new territories ─ the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763.xviii
Under the proclamation, the territory that made up Canada under the French regime was
considerably reduced: the Ohio Valley was cut off, as were the upcountry areas, Lake Champlain,
the Island of Anticosti and Labrador. The new colony was named the colony of Quebec, and its
new boundaries were defined in the proclamation.
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 is not a statute but an edict issued under British
executive authority. It was revoked in part by section 4 of the Quebec Act of 1774.xix However,
section 3 of the Quebec Act provided explicitly that nothing in the act was to extend, nullify,
vary or alter any right, title or possession, however derived, and that, in consequence, these
rights, titles and possessions were to remain in force as if the act had not been passed.
The Canadian constitution refers to the proclamation in section 25 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states that the Charter does not abrogate or derogate from
any rights of Aboriginal peoples recognized by the Royal Proclamation.xx As well, Gwynne J.
(dissenting) described the proclamation as an "Indian Bill of Rights" in the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in St. Catharines Milling,xxi and Hall J. restated this in his dissenting
judgement in Calder.xxii
The text of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 is dense and deals with very diverse subjects.
Certain parts concern the former English colonies, others concern the new colonies, and still
others apply to both types of colonies. The proclamation's lack of clarity still causes much
confusion and difficulty in interpretation. The question of the application of the proclamation to
Quebec territory today is now before the Supreme Court of Canada following two judgements of
the Quebec Court of Appeal on the question.xxiii
The various parts of the proclamation are not clearly identified. Even its structure gives

cause for debate. It can be divided into five parts, each of which begins with a preamble setting
out its context.
The first part creates and defines the territory of the four new colonies: Quebec, West
Florida, East Florida and Grenada. The second part concerns the organization of civil
government in these new colonies. The third part provides for the transfer of land to reformed
English soldiers who had served the British Crown during the war that had just ended.
Finally, the fourth and fifth parts deal with the "nations or tribes of Indians". Slattery
divides the proclamation into four parts, combining what we have called the fourth and fifth
parts.xxiv Our division into five parts is based on the style of the preamble used for each new
part of the text. Resolving this issue is not necessary for our purposes and is beyond the scope of
the study in any event.
After the following preamble,
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest and the Security of our
Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected, and
who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of
such Parts of our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by
Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds...xxv
the fourth part directs that no governor of the new colonies, including Quebec, shall grant a
surveying warrant or a patent for lands in the territory located beyond the borders of the colony
in question.
Furthermore, the fourth part of the proclamation "reserve[s] under our Sovereignty,
Protection and Dominion, for the use of the said Indians", the lands located outside the
boundaries of the colony of Quebec in 1763, the territory of Rupert's Land (granted to the
Hudson's Bay Company by England in 1670), as well as the lands located west of the source of
the rivers that flow into the sea from the west and northwest. It also prohibits the colonists from
purchasing or owning "any lands within the country above described" without the prior
authorization of government authorities.
The preamble to the fifth part declares a desire to end abuses committed in purchasing
lands from the Indians, which had prejudiced England and resulted in dissatisfaction among the
Indians. To remedy this situation, the proclamation forbade the purchase from the Indians of the
lands reserved for them in the parts of the colonies where the Crown had permitted settlement. It
also stated that, should the Indians wish to dispose of such lands, they could in future cede them
only to the Crown.

More than 200 years after the proclamation was issued, its interpretation still gives rise to
controversy, in particular concerning the nature and extent of the rights in question, their
extinguishment or transfer, and the boundaries of the land that was to be reserved for the Indians.
The Commission d'étude sur l'intégrité du territoire du Québec (commission of inquiry
into Quebec's territorial integrity) devoted part of its report to this issue, noting the various
interpretations of the proclamation over the years.xxvi
The justices of the Supreme Court of Canada also expressed opposing views on the
application of the proclamation in their 1973 decision in Calder.xxvii In that case, Judson J.
stated that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 had nothing to do with the issue of Indian title in
British Columbia.xxviii Hall J., on the other hand, believed that the very wording of the
proclamation showed that it was intended to include the lands west of the Rocky Mountains and
should consequently apply to British Columbia.xxix
Although Canadian courts have rendered few decisions concerning the application of the
proclamation to Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada nevertheless established in Sioui that, as
far as the colony of Quebec was concerned, the Royal Proclamation "reserved two types of land
for the Indians: that located outside the colony's territorial limits and the establishments
authorized by the Crown inside the colony".xxx
In December 1763, royal instructions to Governor Murray supplemented the Royal
Proclamation and confirmed its intent, at least the part of it that concerned the relationship to be
established with the Indians.xxxi
Article 60 of the instructions ordered the governor to treat with the Indians of the
province of Quebec, to assure them of the protection and friendship of Great Britain, and to give
them presents so as to induce them gradually to become not only good neighbours of the colony's
British subjects but also good subjects themselves. This instruction was adopted because the
province of Quebec was "in part inhabited and possessed by several Nations and Tribes of
Indians, with whom it is both necessary and expedient to cultivate and maintain a strict
Friendship and good Correspondence".xxxii This article is important in so far as it seems to
confirm both that the Crown did not yet consider Aboriginal peoples its subjects at the time and
that it intended to maintain a special relationship with these peoples.
The next article restates the terms of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, forbidding the
governor to molest or disturb the Indians "in the Possession of such Parts of the said Province, as

they at present occupy or possess".xxxiii The article also directed the governor to obtain more
information concerning their customs and way of life and the laws and constitutions governing
them.
In this way the Crown recognized that Aboriginal peoples at that time were governed by
their own laws and constitutions. In so doing, did the Crown assume an obligation to protect the
Aboriginal peoples and their form of internal government? Is such an obligation fiduciary in
nature, and does it still exist?
Finally, article 62 of the instructions restates the provision of the Royal Proclamation of
1763 to the effect that British subjects may not purchase land from Indians or possess lands
reserved for the various tribes.
These three articles in the instructions to Governor Murray were restated in full in articles
59, 60 and 61 of instructions to Governor Carleton, dated 12 April 1768.xxxiv
New instructions to Governor Carleton, dated 3 January 1775, were accompanied by a
plan for the future management of Indian affairs.xxxv In the management plan we find a general
prohibition on acquiring land from Indians (article 41). Furthermore, the plan directs, measures
should be taken "with the consent and concurrence of the Indians to ascertain and define the
precise and exact boundary and limits of the lands, which it may be proper to reserve to them,
and where no settlement whatsoever shall be allowed".xxxvi
These various instructions are in the same spirit as the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and,
at the least, constitute a historical source of the responsibility assumed by the British Crown with
respect to Aboriginal peoples. This responsibility is the basis for the Crown's fiduciary
obligations.

Historical treaties (Dupuis)
Both France and Great Britain entered into alliances with various Aboriginal nations. We
will not deal with the distinction that was made until recently between pre- and
post-Confederation treaties or between treaties of `peace and friendship' and `land surrender'
treaties.
In this section, we will see that the courts have accorded these alliances the status of
treaties, with legal effect in Canadian domestic law, while refusing to consider them treaties
within the meaning of international law. We do not intend to provide an exhaustive list of such

alliances, but we discuss three examples that illustrate the recent trend toward judicial
re-examination of historical treaties from a new perspective. Among other issues, this
re-examination will determine whether the treaties are a source of fiduciary obligations on the
part of the Crown.
In its decision in Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada established a general guiding
principle for interpreting section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 ─ that the government has a
responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to Aboriginal peoples. The decision in
Sparrow concerned an Aboriginal right, but section 35(1) protects both Aboriginal rights and
treaty rights, and the Supreme Court of Canada gave no indication that principle of interpretation
related only to Aboriginal rights. There is every reason to believe that the Court would also apply
it to treaty rights.
To the extent that the historical alliances are considered treaties, then, the rights they
create could be protected under section 35(1). Aboriginal parties to these treaties could therefore
call on the Crown to fulfil its fiduciary obligations, for example, to have legislation struck down
that encroached on a right created by such a treaty. It is still too soon to assess what scope the
courts intend to give their principle for interpreting section 35(1) and how they will apply it to
this type of treaty or alliance.

The Peace of Montreal (1701) (Dupuis)
The Peace of Montreal, signed in that city on 4 August 1701, put an end to almost 100
years of war between France and the Iroquois. The event brought together representatives of
New France, thirty or so Aboriginal nations that were allied with France, and the Five
Nations.xxxvii
This multilateral peace agreement was preceded in the seventeenth century by various
attempts at peace between the French and the Iroquois, although these did not last. For example,
the French and their Huron, Montagnais and Algonquin allies concluded an agreement with the
Agniers in 1645 at Trois-Rivières. In 1653 the Five Nations obtained an undertaking from the
French at the conference in Montreal to remain neutral in case of war between the Iroquois on
one hand and the Montagnais and the Algonquins on the other. In 1684 the military defeat of the
French, led by Antoine le Febvre de la Barre, by the Tsonnontouans led to a peace agreement
between the Iroquois and the French at Anse-de-la-Famine.

The Five Nations also signed a peace treaty with Great Britain at the Albany Conference
in July 1701. Then, in the summer of 1701, 1300 delegates, representing some 38 nations,
travelled to Montreal to conclude the peace treaty signed on August 4. In addition to the Five
Nations, the upcountry nations ─ bringing together about 30 nations that were allied with the
French ─ were also represented. These upcountry nations included the Hurons, the Outaouais,
the Miamis, the Crees, the Nipissings and the Illinois.xxxviii
In the Quebec Court of Appeal's recent judgement in Adams, which concerned the
Aboriginal rights of the Mohawks, Rothman J., dissenting, wrote as follows about the Peace of
Montreal:
It was not until 1701, with a formal peace treaty between the Five Nations of the Iroquois
Confederacy and the French and their Indian allies, that the Iroquois wars ended. They
had been at war intermittently for almost 100 years. It is, I think, not unreasonable to
conclude that the peace treaty itself was a form of tacit recognition of the independent
status of the Mohawks and the importance of their role.xxxix
Although the issue in Adams did not depend on the characterization of the Peace of
Montreal, and although Rothman's was a dissenting judgement, the fact remains that he gave the
text the status of a formal treaty and even interpreted it as tacit evidence of recognition of the
independent status of the Mohawks at the time the treaty was signed. Although the Supreme
Court of Canada does not have to rule on this question in the appeal of Adams, the question of
the Crown's fiduciary obligations in relation to the protection of rights created by this treaty
could arise at some point.
The Agreement of Swegatchy (1760) (Dupuis)
In another recent judgement, Côté, the Quebec Court of Appeal recognized an agreement
between the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples of Quebec, including the Algonquins, as a treaty. xl
This agreement was apparently concluded at Swegatchy in August 1760 between Sir William
Johnson, superintendent general of Indian Affairs for Britain at the time, and the Confederation
of the Seven Nations of Canada.
There is no written trace of the Agreement of Swegatchy, which was apparently
confirmed at Caughnawaga in September of the same year. However, as evidence of the
existence of this treaty, the court accepted a report on a later meeting at Sault Saint-Louis on 21
August 1769.

The Agreement of Swegatchy was concluded at a time when the French and the British
were still fighting for control of Canada. After the capitulation of Quebec less than a year earlier,
the next goal was control of Montreal. The Agreement of Swegatchy occurred barely a month
before the capitulation of Montreal. The British concluded this alliance with the Indian nations
that were allied with France to guarantee at least their neutrality, if not their co-operation.
Relying on the liberal interpretation mandated by Sioui, Beaudoin J. concluded in Côté
that
There was indeed an actual agreement between the British authorities and the ancestors
of the appellants at Swegatchy and, given the tests prescribed by the Supreme Court, this
agreement seems to me, on the one hand, to be proved and, on the other hand, to
constitute a real treaty within the meaning given to this expression by the highest court in
our country.xli [translation]
Unlike the case involving the Peace of Montreal, the characterization of this agreement is
at the heart of Côté, and the issue will be considered by the Supreme Court of Canada, which has
granted leave to appeal the judgement. Depending on the Supreme Court's characterization, the
issue of the Crown's fiduciary obligation to protect the rights created by this treaty may or may
not arise.
The Murray Treaty (1760) (Dupuis)
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a document signed by General Murray,
representing the British Crown, on 5 September 1760, a few days before the capitulation of
Montreal, as a treaty within the meaning of section 88 of the Indian Act.xlii
We saw earlier that at that time, France and Britain had been at war for more than four
years. The war was to end with the defeat of the French, confirmed by the Treaty of Paris on 10
February 1763. The signature of the treaty by General Murray thus preceded the definitive
surrender of the French by a few days. It was therefore signed when Great Britain did not yet
exercise sovereignty over Canada.
Applying the broad and liberal rule of interpretation in categorizing and analyzing this
document, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Hurons could reasonably have believed that
General Murray had the power to sign a binding treaty. France had signed earlier alliances with
the Hurons to which the Hurons clearly did not feel bound when they agreed to become allies of
the British on 5 September 1760. According to the Court, in this respect there was no basis for

the Hurons to distinguish between the two European states, whose sole purpose was to control
the territory by force. The fact that the Hurons did not sign the document dated 5 September
1760 does not prevent it from being a bilateral instrument. The Indians were a real threat at that
time to both the French and the British.
The sui generis situation in which the Indians were placed had forced the
European mother countries to acknowledge that they had sufficient autonomy
for the valid creation of solemn agreements which were called "treaties",
regardless of the strict meaning given to that word then and now by
international law.xliii
According to the Court, the existence of agreements between the French and the British,
like the Articles of Capitulation of Montreal (1760), did not prevent the signing of independent
agreements between the British and Indian nations, independently of whether they were allies of
the British or the French.
Relying on its earlier decision in Simon,xliv the Supreme Court held that the document
signed by General Murray contained the three elements required for it to constitute a treaty: (1)
an intention to create obligations; (2) the existence of mutual obligations; and (3) a certain
element of solemnity.
Because neither the historical documents nor legislative or administrative history show a
clear and express intention to extinguish this treaty, it is still valid today, even if the Hurons did
not invoke it until the events leading to the Sioui decision. It should be noted that the Supreme
Court characterized this agreement as a treaty within the meaning of the Indian Act. At the
appellants' request, it did not rule on whether the agreement is a treaty within the meaning of
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
According to the Court, the purpose of section 88 of the Indian Act, which provides for
the application of provincial statutes to Indians under certain conditions, is precisely to protect
Indians from any provincial statute whose purpose is to abrogate a treaty-protected right. In the
conflict between the Crown's title to the land and the right of the Hurons to exercise their
treaty-guaranteed rights (the right to practise their religion and their ancestral customs), the Court
concluded that there is no incompatibility between the exercise of the Hurons' rights and the
occupation of the land by the Crown. Consequently, Quebec provincial statutes could not in this
instance be invoked against the Hurons, because the Crown could not prove that "its occupation
of the land cannot accommodate the reasonable exercise of Hurons' rights".xlv
In summary, the historical alliances between successive Crowns and Aboriginal peoples

are now being analyzed in a new light. They are being given the status of treaties, which are
considered one form of the special historical relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal
peoples. It is thus to be expected that the question of whether these alliances create fiduciary
obligations on the part of the Crown will arise.
The Constitution Act, 1867 (McNeil)
The Constitution Act, 1867 provided for the unification of the provinces of Canada, Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick into the Dominion of Canada, a self-governing dominion of the
British Empire.xlvi The Province of Canada was divided into Quebec and Ontario, formerly
Lower and Upper Canada. Legislative powers over domestic matters were distributed between
Parliament and the provincial legislatures, primarily by sections 91 and 92 of the act.xlvii Section
91(24) gave the Parliament of Canada exclusive legislative jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands
reserved for the Indians", from which matching executive authority flows.xlviii Control over
Canada's foreign affairs was retained by the imperial Crown, which exercised this control
through the British government as part of the royal prerogative. This power over foreign affairs
was gradually relinquished to the Canadian government, especially in the post-First World War
period when the British Empire became the British Commonwealth.xlix
The fact that jurisdiction over Indiansl and their reserved landsli was granted to the
Parliament of Canada in 1867, while control over foreign affairs was retained by the British
government, reveals that Aboriginal affairs were regarded as primarily a domestic Canadian
matter by the British legislators who enacted the Constitution Act, 1867.lii In other words, the
Aboriginal nations inhabiting the territories contained within the new Dominion of Canada were
not considered to be foreign nations.liii This view was not necessarily shared by the Aboriginal
nations, who were not consulted and did not consent to the creation of Canada.liv At the time,
and consistently ever since, some of them have regarded themselves as independent nations
whose relations with the Crown are nation-to-nation relations of allies.lv
Although Britain and Canada thought that the Aboriginal nations within Canadalvi were
under Canadian jurisdiction by virtue of section 91(24), this does not mean that the authority of
those nations to govern themselves had been taken away. Their capacity to enter into relations
with foreign nations may have been curtailed, but arguably they retained control over their own
internal affairs to the extent that Canada did not interfere through the exercise of its jurisdiction

under section 91(24).lvii

Before Confederation, jurisdiction over Indian affairs was

exercised by the legislature of the Province of Canada, under the paramount jurisdiction of the
British Parliament.lviii When legislative jurisdiction was distributed between the Parliament of
Canada and the provincial legislatures in 1867, the assignment of authority over Indian affairs to
Parliament would not have changed the nature of the relationship between the Crown and
Aboriginal peoples. The fiduciary obligations created by the process of colonization and
expressed in the Treaty of Utrecht, the Capitulation of Montreal, the Royal Proclamation of
1763, and the historical treaties simply continued. However, primary responsibility for meeting
those obligations shifted from the Province of Canada to a new entity, the Canadian
government.lix However, as the fiduciary obligations are on the Crown in all its capacities, any
government acting on behalf of the Crown is bound by these obligations. This would include not
only the Canadian government, but also the provincial governments and, at least until the
enactment of the Statute of Westminsterlx in 1931, the British government.lxi
As a legal matter, it appears that fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples were
enforceable only against the executive branches of those governments, not against the legislative
branches.lxii This is because the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty (or supremacy) prevents
the courts from questioning the validity of legislation enacted by a legislature within its
constitutional jurisdiction.lxiii A legislature, and hence the Crown when it assented to legislation
violating Aboriginal or treaty rights, might have been in breach of its fiduciary obligations, but
the courts would have been unable to interfere.lxiv As we will see, however, this changed when
the Constitution Act, 1982 was enacted.
In summary, Confederation and the assignment to Parliament of legislative jurisdiction
over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" did not alter the nature of the Crown's
fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples. Those obligations continued, but primary
responsibility for meeting them now rested on the Canadian government.lxv
The Rupert's Land and North-Western Territory Order (1870) (McNeil)
The Canada created by the Constitution Act, 1867 was not the Canada of today. As we
have seen, it consisted of only four provinces, and two of those provinces ─ Quebec and Ontario
─ were much smaller than they are now. However, the act did provide in section 146 for the
expansion of Canada by the admission of new provinces and territories, including Rupert's Land
and the North-Western Territory. Rupert's Land was the name given to the territory granted to the

Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) in 1670 by a royal charter issued by Charles II.lxvi
In the hbc's view, Rupert's Land included all the lands draining into Hudson Bay and
Hudson Strait, a vast territory covering what is now Manitoba, part of Alberta, Saskatchewan and
the Northwest Territories, as well as the portions of present-day Quebec and Ontario that lie
north of the height of land between the Hudson Bay and St. Lawrence/Great Lakes
watersheds.lxvii However, the extent of Rupert's Land is a matter of serious controversy that has
never been resolved satisfactorily.lxviii While there was no dispute between the Hudson's Bay
Company and Canada that the south-eastern boundary coincided with the north-western
boundaries of Quebec and Ontario in 1867, the contention of the hbc that the boundary was
located along the height of land was hotly contested both before and after Confederation. This
controversy was resolved only partially by a decision of the Privy Council in 1884, which
located a portion of Ontario's boundary north of the height of land.lxix Moreover, it can be
argued that the 1670 charter gave the hbc only a right to acquire sovereignty for the Crown and
lands for itself by taking possession and control of the territory within charter's limits. In this
view, the extent of Rupert's Land would be limited to territory the hbc effectively occupied and
controlled and would not include territory that was still occupied and controlled by Aboriginal
nations.lxx As for the North-Western Territory, it appears to have consisted of any territory north
and west of Rupert's Land over which the Crown had acquired sovereignty but that was not part
of British Columbia.lxxi
As provided for by section 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Rupert's Land Act,
1868,lxxii Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory were transferred to Canada by the
Rupert's Land and North-Western Territory Orderlxxiii (referred to hereafter as the Rupert's
Land Order) on 15 July 1870.lxxiv That imperial order in council, which was requested by joint
addresses of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, as required by section 146, is part of
the Canadian constitution.lxxv As such, it could not be amended or repealed in Canada before
the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, and since that time can be amended or repealed only
in accordance with the amending formula contained in that act.lxxvi
The 1870 order transferred Rupert's Land to Canada on terms and conditions contained in
a joint address of the Canadian Parliament adopted in May 1869.lxxvii Two of those terms and
conditions are relevant to the relationship between the government of Canada and the Aboriginal
peoples in Rupert's Land. The first of these became term 14 of the order itself, providing that

14.
Any claims of Indians to compensation for lands required for purposes of
settlement shall be disposed of by the Canadian government in communication with the
Imperial government; and the Company shall be relieved of all responsibility in respect
of them.
This provision acknowledged that the "Indians"lxxviii had land claims in Rupert's Land
before the transfer and shifted responsibility for settling those claims from the Hudson's Bay
Company to the government of Canada.lxxix Moreover, given the constitutional nature of the
Rupert's Land Order, that obligation would be binding on the Parliament of Canada as well. The
requirement of consultation with the British government, while initially maintaining a role for
the imperial Crown, has no doubt lapsed, possibly with the enactment of the Statute of
Westminster in 1931, and certainly with the patriation of the Canadian constitution in 1982.lxxx
The second relevant term of the 1869 joint address provides
That upon the transference of the territories in question to the Canadian government it
will be our duty to make adequate provision for the protection of the Indian tribes whose
interests and well-being are involved in the transfer.lxxxi
Although not included in the terms of the Rupert's Land Order itself, this provision
(which we will call the `protection provision') was approved by Her Majesty along with the other
terms and conditions of the 1869 address.lxxxii It should therefore be binding not only on the
government of Canada, but also on the Parliament of Canada.lxxxiii
This undertaking by Parliament "to make adequate provision for the protection of the
Indian tribes" imposes a constitutional "duty" that would appear to be fiduciary in nature. As we
have seen, Parliament has the power under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to enact
legislation relating to Indians and their reserved lands, but this power is restricted in so far as the
Indians of Rupert's Land are concerned. Section 91(24) and the protection provision together
create a situation where "federal power must be reconciled with federal duty".lxxxiv Those words
of the Supreme Court of Canada refer to the relationship between section 91(24) and section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, but the parallel is obvious: in each case, the jurisdiction of
Parliament is restricted by fiduciary obligations that are constitutionally binding.lxxxv
The duty imposed by the protection provision is owed to the "Indian tribes". Canada is
obliged to safeguard the tribes' "interests and well-being", which must include protecting their
lands and livelihoods as well as their physical existence from the potentially harmful effects of

European settlement in Rupert's Land.lxxxvi But the interests of the tribes can be interpreted as
extending as well to preservation of their cultures and maintenance of their semi-autonomous
political status.lxxxvii This broad interpretation of the word "interests" is supported by numerous
Supreme Court of Canada decisions that have held that treaties and statutes should be given a
broad and liberal interpretation in favour of the Aboriginal peoples affected by them.lxxxviii
The Rupert's Land Order therefore placed a twofold obligation on Canada with respect to
the Aboriginal peoples in Rupert's Land. The first was an obligation on the government of
Canada to settle their land claims, just as Canada was obliged to settle Aboriginal land claims
elsewhere in accordance with the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Second, the government, in both
its legislative and executive capacities, undertook a protective role over the Indian tribes as
collectivities with communal interests. Both these obligations are constitutional and, as such, are
linked closely to the fiduciary obligations that were constitutionalized by section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. But before discussing section 35, we need to examine the impact on these
obligations of the annexation of part of Rupert's Land to Quebec and of settlement of Aboriginal
land claims in the annexed territory.
The Quebec boundary acts (1898 and 1912) (McNeil)
The location of Quebec's northern boundary at the time of Confederation was uncertain.
To resolve this question of the location of the boundary between federal territory (which was
then part of the Northwest Territorieslxxxix) and Quebec, it was agreed in 1898 that Canada and
Quebec would enact concurrent statutesxc setting the boundary along the eastern shore of James
Bay to the mouth of the Eastmain River, up that river to the most northerly point of Patamisk
Lake, then due east to the Hamilton River and down that river to the western boundary of
Labrador.xci It must be emphasized that this boundary was the result of a political accord, put
into effect by legislation. Whether it corresponded with the legal boundary of Quebec before the
enactment of the 1898 statutes has never been determined.xcii Moreover, to the extent that the
1898 statutes purported to include territory in Quebec that was not part of Canada at the time,
they would have been invalid.xciii
As a result of a further agreement, Canada consented in 1912 to extend the northern
boundary of Quebec from the 1898 line to its present location along Hudson Bay and Hudson
Strait to the western boundary of Labrador.xciv This agreement was also implemented by

concurrent Canadian and Quebec statutes.xcv Although it was assumed at the time that all the
territory added to Quebec by the 1912 statutes had previously been part of Rupert's Land, we
have seen that this assumption can be challenged to the extent that the Hudson's Bay Company
was not in effective occupation and control before the transfer of Rupert's Land to Canada in
1870.xcvi
The 1912 statutes contained the following specific conditions relating to the Aboriginal
peoples living in the territory Quebec acquired:
2.
(c) That the province of Quebec will recognize the rights of the Indian inhabitants
in the territory above described to the same extent, and will obtain surrenders of such
rights in the same manner, as the government of Canada has heretofore recognized such
rights and has obtained surrender thereof, and the said province shall bear and satisfy all
charges and expenditure in connection with or arising out of such surrenders;
(d) That no such surrender shall be made or obtained except with the approval of the
Governor in Council;
(e) That the trusteeship of the Indians in the said territory, and the management of any
lands now or hereafter reserved for their use, shall remain in the government of Canada
subject to the control of Parliament.
Section 2(c) apparently had a dual purpose. First, it ensured that the land rights of the
Aboriginal peoples within the part of Rupert's Land being transferred to Quebec would continue
to be protected, as they were by term 14 of the Rupert's Land Order. Second, it attempted to shift
responsibility for settling Aboriginal land claims from the federal government to the government
of Quebec. The federal government obviously wanted to avoid the situation it had been placed in
by decisions of the Privy Council, whereby it bore the cost of settling land claims within
provincial boundaries while the provinces reaped the benefits by having provincial Crown lands
freed of the burden of Aboriginal title.xcvii
From a constitutional perspective, section 2(c) is problematic. Term 14 of the Rupert's
Land Order placed responsibility for settling Aboriginal land claims on the government of
Canada. Canada could not escape that constitutional responsibility by attempting to shift it
entirely to the province of Quebec. Moreover, it is questionable whether section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 allows the federal government to delegate responsibility for settling these
claims to the provinces.xcviii Perhaps Canada believed it had dealt with this problem by retaining
a supervisory role in the requirement in section 2(d) that surrenders negotiated by the province
be approved by the governor in council.

With respect to the interpretation of section 2(c), the term "Indian inhabitants" no doubt
includes the Inuit living in the northern part of the transferred territory.xcix The section
acknowledges that Canada had previously recognized that those inhabitants have rights, which
must refer to the recognition in the 1869 Joint Address of the Canadian Parliament, the terms of
which were approved by Her Majesty and given constitutional force by the Rupert's Land Order.
As we have seen, that recognition not only extended to land rights but also included protection of
the interests and well-being of the Aboriginal peoples as semi-autonomous nations.c So by
providing that "the province of Quebec will recognize the rights of the Indian inhabitants in the
territory", section 2(c) required that Quebec respect those rights to the same extent that Canada
was obliged to respect them.
However, the extent to which Quebec could deal with those rights is limited by sections
2(c) and 2(e). Section 2(c) provides that Quebec "will obtain surrenders of such rights in the
same manner, as the government of Canada has heretofore...obtained surrender thereof". As
Canada had not entered into any agreements for the surrender of the rights of the Aboriginal
peoples in the territory involved in the 1912 boundary extension, this provision must refer to
surrenders that Canada had obtained previously in other parts of the territory thought to be
covered by the Rupert's Land Order, that is, the numbered treaties signed within Rupert's Land in
the period between 1870 and 1912.ci Those treaties involved the surrender of land rights in
exchange for other rights and benefits but did not provide for the surrender of governmental
powers by the Aboriginal peoples who signed them.cii For this reason, section 2(c) gave Quebec
only limited authority to negotiate land surrenders along the lines of the earlier numbered
treaties; it did not authorize Quebec to deal with Aboriginal rights, such as rights of
self-government, that were not dealt with in those treaties. In negotiating land surrenders,
Quebec would be subject to the same fiduciary obligations as Canada. Neither the Crown nor
Parliament could escape its fiduciary obligations, which were constitutionally entrenched by the
Rupert's Land Order, by enacting legislation to transfer primary responsibility for settling land
claims from the federal to a provincial government.
This interpretation of section 2(c) is supported by section 2(e), which, as we have seen,
provides that "the trusteeship of the Indians in the said territory, and the management of any
lands now or hereafter reserved for their use, shall remain in the government of Canada subject
to the control of Parliament." To the extent that this provision affirms federal jurisdiction under

section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and federal responsibility under the Rupert's Land
Order, it is merely declaratory. This is confirmed by the words "shall remain". The use of the
term "trusteeship" is especially significant in this context, as it reveals an understanding on the
part of Parliament that the Crown has trust-like obligations to Aboriginal peoples, primary
responsibility for which is placed on the federal government, no doubt by section 91(24) and the
Rupert's Land Order.
To the extent that the territory added to Quebec in 1912 was already part of Canada,ciii
authority for the extension of Quebec's boundaries can be found in section 3 of the Constitution
Act, 1871,civ which provides that
3.
The Parliament of Canada may from time to time, with the consent of the
Legislature of any province of the said Dominion, increase, diminish, or otherwise alter
the limits of such Province, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed to by the
said Legislature...
Once the boundary extension acts were enacted, however, it would not be possible for
either Parliament or the Quebec Assembly unilaterally to alter the agreement implemented by
those acts (by amending or repealing its own legislation), as that would violate the spirit and
intent, if not the actual terms, of section 3. In that sense, the boundary extension acts are
`constitutional', as the Supreme Court of Canada described them in the Sparrow decision.cv
Concurrent enactments by Canada and Quebec could, however, repeal or amend those acts. This
in fact was done in 1977, when sections 2(c), (d) and (e) were repealed by the legislation
implementing the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, discussed later in this paper.cvi
However, in light of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and of the fiduciary aspect of
the Rupert's Land Order, this repeal is probably of little significance.cvii
In conclusion, the Quebec boundary acts of 1898 and 1912 did not affect the nature of the
fiduciary obligations which Canada owed to the Aboriginal peoples. In any territory that may
have been added to Quebec by the 1898 acts, Canada's obligations would simply have continued,
given their constitutional status arising from section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the
Rupert's Land Order. Similarly, in the territory given to Quebec in 1912, the same constitutional
obligations would have continued to bind Canada. However, assuming that the transfer to
Quebec of concurrent authority to settle land claims was constitutional, Quebec also incurred the
fiduciary obligations applicable to the negotiation of land claims.

The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and its implementing legislation (Dupuis)
The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) was signed on 11
November 1975. It was the result of an agreement between, on one hand, the government of
Canada and the government of Quebec (and the James Bay Energy Corporation, the James Bay
Development Corporation and Hydro-Quebec) and, on the other, the Grand Council of the Crees
(and the members of eight Cree bands) and the Northern Quebec Inuit Association (and the Inuit
of Quebec and the Inuit of Port Burwell).cviii
Paragraph 2.4 of the JBNQA states that it constitutes an out-of-court settlement of legal
proceedings, related to the James Bay hydroelectric project, brought by the Association of
Quebec Indians against the government of Quebec in 1972.cix This 455-page document is
divided into 31 chapters and covers a broad range of subjects. The style of the document reveals
the context of the negotiations, where the political desire of the parties, sharpened by the
pressure of legal proceedings, was to reach a compromise as soon as possible.
Under the JBNQA, the Crees and the Inuit of Quebec were to receive financial
compensation of $232.5 million over a period of 21 years in return for surrendering to Quebec
their rights over the land. In addition, the agreement provides for the establishment of
administrative structures and special programs for the Crees and the Inuit.
The JBNQA was the first land claims agreement concluded after the adoption of the federal
land claims policy in 1973. The Northeastern Quebec Agreement (NQA), between all the parties
to the JBNQA and the Naskapi Indians of Quebec, was added to it in 1978. This collateral
agreement extended the benefits of the JBNQA to the Naskapis. The JBNQA and the NQA are the
only agreements of this kind covering lands in Quebec, although other claims related to land in
the province are currently being negotiated or discussed.cx The JBNQA has been amended by 12
additional agreements concluded by the parties between 1975 and 1993.
The federal government's land claims policy was adopted in 1973 in the wake of the
Calder decision and the lawsuit brought by the Association of Quebec Indians. The policy refers
to, among other things, Aboriginal peoples' rights to land based on occupation and use of their
traditional lands and the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which, according to the government,
recognized that Aboriginal peoples had title to the lands they inhabited at the time.cxi
The preamble to the JBNQA revolves around two poles:

1. organization, good government and orderly development of Quebec's northern territory
(under the 1898 federal and provincial legislation establishing the province's boundaries
and the 1912 statutes extending them);cxii and
2. satisfaction of the obligations assumed by Quebec with respect to the Aboriginal
peoples inhabiting this territory and of the terms and conditions of the surrender of rights
referred to in the 1912 federal legislation, since the Crees and the Inuit had consented to
an agreement to this effect.

We saw earlier that the Hudson's Bay Company returned Rupert's Land to the British
Crown, which then transferred it to Canada in 1870. Under sections 2(c), (d) and (e) of the 1912
federal statute, Canada accordingly transferred to Quebec, at least in part, the duty it had under
the Rupert's Land Order of 1870, which transferred Rupert's Land to Canada.
Section 1 of the 1912 Quebec legislation provides that the provincial legislature agreed to
this extension of its boundaries under the terms, conditions and provisions stated in the federal
act. In fact, the Quebec statute implements section 4 of the federal legislation, which provided
that it was to come into force after the province consented to extend its boundaries and agreed to
the terms, conditions and provisions stated there.
Parliament and the Quebec National Assembly gave effect to the JBNQA by enacting the
James Bay and Northern Quebec Native Claims Settlement Act and the Act Approving the
Agreement Concerning James Bay and Northern Quebec respectively.cxiii
The federal statute implementing the JBNQA, enacted in 1977, states in its preamble that
"Parliament and the government of Canada recognize and affirm a special responsibility for the
Crees and Inuit". This modern-day affirmation by the Crown of its special responsibility for the
Aboriginal peoples who signed the agreement suggests that the agreement can be considered a
source of a fiduciary obligation for the federal Crown.
While implementing the agreement, the statute extinguished "all native claims, rights,
title and interests, whatever they may be, in and to the Territory [covered by the agreement] of all
Indians and all Inuit" (section 3), whether or not they were signatories of the agreement. It can be
asked whether this unilateral extinguishment of the rights of Aboriginal peoples who did not sign
the agreement constitutes a violation by Canada of its fiduciary obligations to them, which are
based on, among other things, its commitment in the 1912 legislation extending the boundaries

of Quebec. Moreover, we have seen that the 1870 Rupert's Land Order placed a constitutional
obligation on Canada to settle Aboriginal land claims. As this obligation would probably be
violated by unilateral extinguishment, it may be that the extinguishment of the land rights of
non-signatories is invalid.
Paragraph 2.14 of the JBNQA was adopted specifically to meet the objections of
Aboriginal peoples who had not signed the agreement and whose rights Parliament was going to
extinguish without their consent and without compensation. This was the situation of the
Algonquins, the Atikamekw, the Montagnais and the Naskapis, among others. When the
agreement was being negotiated, the Montagnais of Schefferville refused to take part in
negotiations that excluded other Montagnais bands not living on the land in question.cxiv
Following discussions, the Northeastern Quebec Agreement was signed on 31 January 1978
between the parties to the JBNQA and the Naskapis of Schefferville. Complementary Agreement
No. 1, which amended the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, was signed at the same
time to allow the provisions of the agreement to apply to the Naskapis.cxv Like the JBNQA, the
NQA included

the surrender by the Naskapis of their rights to the lands covered by the JBNQA.

Paragraph 2.14 of the JBNQA provides that
Quebec undertakes to negotiate with other Indians or Inuit who are not entitled to
participate in the compensation and benefits of the present Agreement, in respect
of any claims which such Indians or Inuit may have with respect to the Territory.
Notwithstanding the undertakings of the preceding sub-paragraph, nothing
in the present paragraph shall be deemed to constitute a recognition, by Canada,
or Quebec, in any manner whatsoever, of any rights of such Indians or Inuit.
Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the obligations, if any, that Canada
may have with respect to the Territory. This paragraph shall not be enacted into
law.cxvi
Does the last sentence not confirm that Canada agreed not only to extinguish unilaterally
the rights of Aboriginal peoples who had not signed the agreement (which raises the issue of its
fiduciary obligations to them), but also to exclude the province's commitment to negotiate from
its implementing legislation?
It must be remembered that the JBNQA and the implementing legislation preceded the
Constitution Act, 1982 and, in particular, the 1983 constitutional amendment to section 35, which
represented a major change in the legal protection afforded such agreements. Before 1982, the
JBNQA did

not have constitutional protection. We will see later that section 35(3) was added in

1983 to provide constitutional protection to rights resulting from land claims agreement like the
JBNQA. Whatever

the intent of the parties in excluding paragraph 2.14 from the federal

implementing legislation at the time the agreement was signed, the issue must now be analyzed
in light of the new constitutional status of the rights flowing from the agreement.
The federal implementing legislation repealed paragraphs 2(c), (d) and (e) of the 1912
federal boundaries act, which concerned Aboriginal peoples, as well as the part of the section
referring to "the following terms and conditions and subject to the following provisions".cxvii
In addition to enacting a general statute to give effect to the JBNQA,cxviii the Quebec
National Assembly passed more than 20 statutes entrenching the provisions of the agreement.
The National Assembly proceeded by way of both specific legislation, such as the Act respecting
income security for Cree hunters and trappers who are beneficiaries under the agreement
concerning James Bay and Northern Quebec,cxix and amendments to existing general legislation
such as the Act to again amend the Environment Quality Act.cxx
In the judgement rendered in Cree Regional Authority v. Canada (Federal
Administrator), Rouleau J. of the Federal Court, Trial Division, concluded that, as in Guerin, the
federal government assumed fiduciary obligations when it extinguished the rights of Aboriginal
peoples in section 3(3) of the JBNQA implementing legislation. Furthermore, he stated that "[i]n
light of the fiduciary obligation imposed upon the federal government in its dealing with the
native population...the Agreement mandates the protection of the aboriginal people who
relinquished substantial rights in return for the protection of both levels of government".cxxi
In other respects, the Federal Court of Appeal has held that even if the relationship
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is recognized as fiduciary, this relationship "requires
good faith and reasonableness on both sides and presumes that each party respects the
obligations that it assumed toward the other".cxxii In this case, when the Aboriginal party argued
that the principle of interpreting ambiguities in their favour results from the fiduciary
relationship between them and the Crown, the Court replied that when the Crown negotiates land
claims agreements with Aboriginal peoples today, it "need not and cannot have only these
interests in mind. It must seek a compromise between that interest and the interests of the whole
of society, which it also represents and of which aboriginals are part".cxxiii
In our opinion, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement is one source of the
federal Crown's fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal peoples affected by the agreement.

To the extent that this land claims agreement is protected by section 35(3) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, the rights it creates are protected on the same basis as treaty rights.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's general guiding principle for interpreting section 35(1) also
applies to rights created by the agreement. Given the constitutional protection extended to the
rights flowing from the agreement, the JBNQA will necessarily have to be considered in any
process involving the sovereignty of Quebec. As a signatory of the agreement, the federal
government is bound by constitutional obligations that cannot be waived without the consent of
the other parties to the agreement.
Moreover, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement could be a source of fiduciary
obligations for the Quebec Crown, which is also a signatory of the agreement, to the extent of the
commitments the Quebec government made in the agreement. It is too soon to define the scope
of these obligations precisely, but it is likely that the courts will extend the fiduciary obligations
to the provincial Crown if it can be established that the provincial Crown is, on the basis of the
JBNQA,

in a legal position equivalent to the one that gave rise to the federal Crown's fiduciary

obligations. As the Supreme Court has stated, each treaty is unique and generates obligations,
although all obligations created by treaty or agreement do not necessarily create fiduciary
obligations.cxxiv
Thus, several legal situations can create fiduciary obligations on the part of the Crown to
the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. As the existence of fiduciary relationships between these two
parties does not automatically generate fiduciary obligations for the Crown, each source
constitutes a special case. It is thus impossible to draw the conclusion that any one specific
source necessarily results in a particular obligation.
The Constitution Act, 1982 (McNeil)
The Constitution Act, 1982, as amended,cxxv contains three provisions relating expressly
to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. Section 25 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms protects Aboriginal, treaty and other rights and freedoms of Aboriginal peoples from
abrogation or derogation by the Charter.cxxvi This section acknowledges the special constitutional
status of Aboriginal peoples and places their rights outside the scope of the fundamental
principles of the Charter governing the relationship between Canadians and the federal and
provincial governments.cxxvii In the context of Canada's fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal

peoples, section 25 should probably be viewed more as an acknowledgement of the existence of
those obligations than as an affirmation of them. The legislators responsible for section 25
recognized and acted upon an obligation to make special provision to protect the rights of
Aboriginal peoples and ensured that these peoples would have the legal means to defend their
rights against Charter challenges.cxxviii
Another provision, section 35.1, states that
35.1 The government of Canada and the provincial governments are committed
to the principle that, before any amendment is made to Class 24 of section 91 of
the "Constitution Act, 1867", to section 25 of this Act or to this Part,
(a)
a constitutional conference that includes in its agenda an item relating to
the proposed amendment, composed of the Prime Minister of Canada and the first
ministers of the provinces, will be convened by the Prime Minister of Canada; and
(b)
the Prime Minister of Canada will invite representatives of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada to participate in the discussions on that item.
This section requires consultation with Aboriginal peoples before amendments are made
to the principal constitutional provisions respecting their rights. Although it falls short of a
requirement for Aboriginal consent to any such amendments, it nonetheless provides a basis for
fiduciary principles to be applied at the level of the constitutional amendment process.
For Aboriginal participation in section 35.1 talks to be meaningful, first ministers would
have to consider seriously the views of Aboriginal representatives and take those views into
account before proceeding with any amendments to the specified provisions. In other words, it
would not be sufficient for first ministers simply to go through the motions of consultation. As
the requirement for consultation is constitutional, it would ultimately be up to the courts to
decide whether it had been met adequately. In doing so, it is suggested that the courts would use
the fiduciary obligations owed to Aboriginal peoples as a means of deciding the issue. This
approach would be consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Sparrow, where it said that
the presence or absence of consultation with Aboriginal peoples would be a factor to be
considered in deciding whether a federal law infringing Aboriginal rights could be justified.cxxix
Consultation is thus an aspect of the fiduciary relationship that the Court identified as the guiding
principle against which the actions of government with respect to Aboriginal peoples must be
assessed.cxxx Where section 35.1 is concerned, the requirement for consultation is constitutionally
explicit. Fiduciary principles therefore should apply in deciding whether the requirement has
been met adequately.cxxxi
The most important provision relating to Aboriginal peoples in the 1982 act is section 35,

which provides that
35.
(1)
The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples
of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2)
In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian,
Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.
(3)
For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights" includes
rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.
(4)
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and
treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and
female persons.
Section 35(1) was interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the Sparrow decision. The Court said that it had found in Guerincxxxii that
...the Crown owed a fiduciary obligation to the Indians with respect to the lands
[reserve lands surrendered to the Crown for lease to a golf club]. The sui generis
nature of Indian title, and the historic powers and responsibilities assumed by the
Crown constituted the source of such a fiduciary obligation.cxxxiii
The Court went on to combine the Guerin approach with a principle laid down by the
Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Taylor and Williams that, in approaching Indian treaties, "[t]he
honour of the Crown is always involved and no appearance of `sharp dealing' should be
sanctioned."cxxxiv Those two cases, the Supreme Court said,
...ground a general guiding principle for s. 35(1). That is, the government has the
responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. The
relationship between the government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than
adversarial, and the contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights
must be defined in light of this historic relationship.cxxxv
The Court then applied this guiding principle to oblige the federal government to justify
any infringement of Aboriginal rights by meeting a stringent test.cxxxvi
The Sparrow decision recognized that the fiduciary obligations owed to Aboriginal
peoples are not limited to the context of land surrenders. The whole relationship between the
federal government and Aboriginal peoples is trust-like, requiring the government to be sensitive
to and respectful of the rights of those peoples.cxxxvii Moreover, section 35(1) has
constitutionalized the obligations, so that they bind the legislative as well as the executive branch
of government. In other words, Parliament has to meet the obligations in enacting legislation,
just as the Crown must in exercising its prerogative and delegated authority. As the Supreme
Court said, federal legislative powers, including the power under section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 to enact legislation relating to Indians, must now be read together with s.
35(1). In other words, federal power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to

achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any government regulation that
infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights.cxxxviii
In this respect, our interpretation of the Rupert's Land Order, which also placed
constitutional obligations of a fiduciary nature on the Parliament of Canada,cxxxix is consistent
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 35(1) in this case.
Although the Supreme Court did not deal directly with the application of section 35(1) to
provincial governments in Sparrow, it did make the general statement that the section "also
affords aboriginal peoples constitutional protection against provincial legislative power."cxl The
Court did not specify, however, whether provincial governments can avail themselves of the test
the Court applied to the justification of federal infringements of Aboriginal rights. Professors
Brian Slattery and Peter Hogg, two influential commentators on the constitutional rights of
Aboriginal peoples, have nonetheless concluded that provincial infringements of those rights
cannot be justified by the Sparrow test.cxli According to Professor Slattery, federal power to
infringe Aboriginal rights in justifiable circumstances comes from section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867. As federal jurisdiction over Indians and their reserved lands is exclusive,
there can be no equivalent power in the provincial legislatures.cxlii Adopting this reasoning, we
agree that provincial legislation, unless referentially incorporated into federal law, is ineffective
and unjustifiable to the extent that it attempts to infringe Aboriginal rights.cxliii
While the Sparrow decision was limited to the infringement of Aboriginal rights,
equivalent reasoning has been applied by some courts to infringements of treaty rights. cxliv It can
be argued, however, that infringements of treaty rights cannot be justified by the Sparrow
test because violation of those solemn agreements directly involves the honour of the Crown,
which the Supreme Court in Sparrow identified as a "guiding interpretive principle" where
dealings with Aboriginal peoples are concerned.cxlv In any case, we have seen that section 35(3)
provides that the words "treaty rights" in subsection (1) include "rights that now exist by way of
land claims agreements or may be so acquired." So any treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of
Quebec, including rights under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the
Northeastern Quebec Agreement, are constitutionally protected and arguably cannot be infringed
legislatively, even by federal legislation that meets the justificatory test set out in Sparrow.
Quebec does not have the constitutional authority to infringe those rights. Moreover, the
fiduciary obligations that Canada owes to the Aboriginal peoples of Quebec may impose an

active duty on Canada to protect them against infringements of their Aboriginal and treaty rights
by Quebec. In practical terms, this could mean that the government of Canada has an obligation
to put political pressure on the Quebec government, and other provincial governments as well, to
prevent any such infringements. In the event that political pressure failed, the government of
Canada might be obliged to undertake or finance legal action challenging the constitutional
validity of any attempted infringements.
The general fiduciary obligations of the federal government under section 35(1) are owed
to the "Aboriginal peoples of Canada", defined in subsection (2) as including the "Indian, Inuit
and Métis peoples of Canada." So whether the term "Indians" in section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 includes the Métis as well as the Indians and Inuit is not relevant to
section 35(1).cxlvi In Sparrow, the Supreme Court did not limit the application of fiduciary
obligations to the Indians. On the contrary, it said that "the government has the responsibility to
act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples."cxlvii As the Court was discussing
the rights of those peoples in the context of section 35, it must have been referring to Aboriginal
peoples as defined there. The fiduciary obligations are therefore owed to the Métis as well as to
the Indians and Inuit.
To sum up, the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982 that are most relevant to the
fiduciary obligations owed to Aboriginal peoples are sections 35 and 35.1. Section 35(1)
constitutionalizes the Crown's fiduciary obligations and makes them enforceable against
Parliament as well as against the executive branch of the federal government. Absent referential
incorporation into federal law, the section also prevents any infringement of Aboriginal and
treaty rights by the provinces, including Quebec. As part of its fiduciary obligations, the
government of Canada may have a positive duty to prevent provincial infringements of those
rights. The federal and provincial governments are also required by section 35.1 to hold
meaningful consultations with representatives of Aboriginal peoples before making
constitutional amendments to the principal constitutional provisions respecting their rights. In the
event of litigation over this provision, the courts would probably apply fiduciary principles in
deciding whether the requirement had been met.

PART II
The Nature of the Obligations (Dupuis/McNeil)
Generally
In our discussion of their sources, we saw that fiduciary obligations flow from the
historical relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, as revealed in the
documentary record we examined. These obligations act as a check on any power the Crown (the
executive branch of government) has over Aboriginal peoples. To the extent that the Crown has
discretionary power to make decisions affecting Aboriginal peoples, it is bound by those
obligations to act for their benefit.cxlviii But as we have seen, parliamentary power over
Aboriginal peoples was generally not subject to enforceable fiduciary obligations.cxlix That
changed with the enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which imposed
enforceable fiduciary obligations on Parliament by recognizing and affirming Aboriginal and
treaty rights in the constitution.cl
To the extent that fiduciary obligations arise in the context of governmental power over
Aboriginal peoples,cli the obligations of the Crown and the obligations of Parliament are
probably not identical. The authority of the Crown is limited to prerogative and statutory
powers,clii whereas Parliament has broad legislative power under section 91(24) to enact laws in
relation to Aboriginal peoples.cliii In either case, the fiduciary obligations would attach to the
exercise of the powers and would therefore be co-extensive with the extent of the powers.
We also saw earlier that section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides a shield
against infringement of Aboriginal and treaty rights by the provinces.cliv It may be that neither
the Crown in right of any of the provinces nor the provincial legislatures have any powers over
those rights. If so, it would seem to follow that, to the extent that fiduciary obligations arise from
discretionary powers over Aboriginal peoples, the absence of powers would result in an absence
of obligations. However, by the enactment of section 88 of the Indian Act,clv Parliament has
made some provincial laws of general application apply to Indians, thereby giving the provincial
legislatures limited powers to infringe Aboriginal rights.clvi To the extent that the provincial
legislatures have this power, they should be subject to the same fiduciary obligations and the
same test for justification as Parliament.clvii
Although the discretionary power of the Crown and Parliament and, to a lesser extent, the

provincial legislatures over the Aboriginal peoples is a major reason for the existence of
fiduciary obligations, it is not the only reason. As we have seen, the obligations also arise from
undertakings by the Crown and Parliament, in such documents as the Royal Proclamation of
1763 and the joint address approved by the Rupert's Land Order, to fulfil a protective role where
the interests of Aboriginal peoples are concerned. In the Royal Proclamation, the Crown acted to
protect Aboriginal peoples from interference with their land rights and exploitation by European
settlers.clviii In the joint address, Parliament undertook "to make adequate provision for the
protection of the Indian tribes whose interests and well-being are involved in the transfer" of
Rupert's Land.clix These documents created positive obligations that go beyond a mere duty not
to exercise discretionary powers to the detriment of Aboriginal peoples. The Crown and
Parliament undertook to protect the interests of those peoples against third parties, including
provincial governments. Moreover, in many of the treaties, and in modern land claims
agreements like the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the Northeastern Quebec
Agreement, discussed earlier, the Crown undertook to set aside lands for the Aboriginal
signatories and to provide other benefits. These treaties and agreements created obligations that
are binding on the Crown in all its capacitiesclx and that now impose fiduciary obligations on
Parliament as well, because of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.clxi
For purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to attempt to define the full scope of the
fiduciary obligations of the Crown and Parliament to Aboriginal peoples. Instead, we will focus
on matters that relate most directly to federal responsibilities in the context of accession to
sovereignty by Quebec, namely, fiduciary obligations with respect to Aboriginal
self-determination and land and resource rights. We examine these matters first in a general way
and then with direct reference to Quebec.
Self-determination, including self-government
If the Aboriginal peoples of Canada have a broad right of external self-determination,
permitting them to secede from Canada if they so wish and set up independent states, the source
of this right must lie outside domestic law. Canadian constitutional law does not contain a right
of secession.clxii Aboriginal peoples may nonetheless have a more limited constitutional right of
internal self-determination in Canadian law that would allow them to exercise some degree of
sovereignty or jurisdiction over their own citizens (personal jurisdiction) and territories

(territorial jurisdiction). This right of internal self-determination would stem from the fact that
the Aboriginal peoples were independent, sovereign nations before European colonization of
North America. Successful assertions of sovereignty by European nations diminished but did not
abrogate the inherent sovereignty of Aboriginal nations.clxiii Moreover, it can be argued that
extensions of Canadian jurisdiction over Aboriginal nations by section 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867 and the enactment of the Indian Act did not eliminate Aboriginal sovereignty.clxiv If so,
Aboriginal peoples retained the inherent right to govern themselves and their territories, subject
to any valid Canadian legislation limiting or regulating that right of self-government.clxv
If this inherent right of self-government was not extinguished before 17 April 1982,clxvi it
would have been in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force. Assuming it is an
Aboriginal right or a treaty right, it would have been recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of
that act.clxvii Within the constitutional space provided by that section, Aboriginal peoples would
be self-determining in the sense that they could decide for themselves to a certain extent how
they wanted to exercise their right of self-government within Canada.clxviii
If the right of self-government has constitutional status, it can be extinguished only by
constitutional amendment.clxix However, according to the Sparrow decision it could nonetheless
be regulated by federal legislation that meets a strict test of justification.clxx It is in this context
that the fiduciary obligations begin to come into play. As we have seen, the Sparrow decision
broadened those obligations to cover the whole relationship between Canada and Aboriginal
peoples, binding both the executive and the legislative branch of the federal government.clxxi So
any regulation of the right of self-government by federal legislation would have to be consistent
with Canada's fiduciary obligations. As the Supreme Court said in Sparrow, "[t]he special trust
relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis aboriginals must be the first
consideration in determining whether the legislation or action in question can be justified."clxxii
To give one example, to the extent that the Indian Act purports to regulate Aboriginal
self-government by dictating the form and powers of Indian governments on reserves,clxxiii it
would be subject to scrutiny and possible invalidation as an unjustifiable infringement of the
right of self-government.clxxiv
The fiduciary obligations are owed to Aboriginal nations as political entities with
collective rights.clxxv The federal government, as a consequence of its constitutional jurisdiction
over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians", has primary responsibility for fulfilling those

obligations.clxxvi As the Supreme Court said in Sparrow, "federal power must be reconciled with
federal duty."clxxvii In the context of the Aboriginal right to fish, this duty required the federal
government to justify any federal infringements of that right. However, in the context of an
attempted infringement of an Aboriginal right by a province, we have seen that the federal duty
may require active intervention by the federal government to protect the right.clxxviii This is in
keeping with the undertaking of Parliament, when Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory
were transferred to Canada in 1870, "to make adequate provision for the protection of the Indian
tribes whose interests and well-being are involved in the transfer".clxxix
Land and resource rights
In Guerin,clxxx the Supreme Court decided that the Crown has a fiduciary obligation to
Aboriginal nations with respect to their surrendered lands. Although the case involved reserve
lands, the principles that guided the Court are clearly applicable to lands held by Aboriginal title
as well. According to Dickson J., who delivered the judgement of four of the eight-member
bench,
[t]he fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Indians has its roots in the concept
of aboriginal, native or Indian title. The fact that Indian Bands have a certain interest in
land does not, however, in itself give rise to a fiduciary relationship between the Indians
and the Crown. The conclusion that the Crown is a fiduciary depends upon the further
proposition that the Indian interest in the land is inalienable except upon surrender to the
Crown....
The Crown first took this responsibility upon itself in the Royal Proclamation of
1763. It is still recognized in the surrender provisions of the Indian Act. The surrender
requirement, and the responsibility it entails, are the source of a distinct fiduciary
obligation owed by the Crown to the Indians.clxxxi
Wilson J., speaking for herself and two other justices, also found that "[t]he [fiduciary]
obligation has its roots in the aboriginal title of Canada's Indians". She decided that section 18 of
the Indian Act ─ which provides that reserves are held by the Crown for the use and benefit of
the bands for which they are set apart ─ "is the acknowledgement of a historic reality, namely
that Indian Bands have a beneficial interest in their reserves and that the Crown has a
responsibility to protect that interest and make sure that any purpose to which reserve land is put
will not interfere with it." Justice Wilson clearly regarded this responsibility as involving a
positive duty to safeguard Indian interests. Referring to the Crown, she wrote that "it does hold
the [reserve] lands subject to a fiduciary obligation to protect and preserve the Bands' interests

from invasion or destruction."clxxxii
Given that the fiduciary obligations of the federal government extend to lands held by
Aboriginal title as well as reserve lands, the government has a duty to ensure that the interests of
Aboriginal peoples are protected in any surrender of their title to the Crown. Compliance with
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Rupert's Land Order would be required as well, of
course, in parts of Canada where those constitutional instruments apply.clxxxiii Although Guerin
did not determine the existence or the nature of the fiduciary obligations before a surrender, it is
clear from the decision that a surrender of Aboriginal lands does give rise to fiduciary
obligations.clxxxiv Moreover, the federal government has a continuing obligation to ensure that the
terms of the surrender are carried out, both by living up to its own commitments and by ensuring
that other parties to or beneficiaries of the surrender comply with the terms of the surrender. This
is a broad duty that includes, but is not limited to, any obligations set out specifically in the
surrender document.clxxxv
In Guerin, the Supreme Court held that the Crown in right of Canada breached its
fiduciary obligation to the Musqueam Indians by entering into a lease for some of their reserve
lands on terms less favourable than those discussed earlier with the Musqueams. That is just one
context for the application of the federal government's fiduciary obligations regarding Aboriginal
land and resource rights. In the Sparrow decision, the Supreme Court regarded those obligations
as extending to government action generally. As we have seen, the Court said that
...the government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect
to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the government and aboriginals is
trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation
of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship.clxxxvi
The Court required the federal government to meet a stringent test to justify any
infringement of the Musqueams' Aboriginal right to fish. If the government could not do so, it
was acting in breach of its fiduciary obligations to them and in violation of their constitutional
rights. The fiduciary obligations therefore include the safeguarding of Aboriginal resource use
pursuant to Aboriginal or treaty rights.clxxxvii
In Quebec
Case law has not indicated that the fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples in Quebec
are generally any different from those in the rest of Canada. Although the two leading cases on
fiduciary obligations, Guerin and Sparrow, both involved the Musqueam Nation in British

Columbia, the Supreme Court spoke as though the obligations are owed equally to Aboriginal
peoples throughout Canada.clxxxviii Moreover, Quebec (A.G.) v. Canada (N.E.B.) involved a claim
by the Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec) that the National Energy Board (NEB) owed them
a fiduciary duty when making a decision on whether to grant a licence to export electricity from
a hydroelectric project. The Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between the federal government and the Aboriginal peoples of Quebec. However, it
decided that the NEB did not have a fiduciary duty when acting in its quasi-judicial capacity to
decide whether to grant an export licence. Iacobucci J., who delivered the unanimous judgement,
said:
It is now well settled that there is a fiduciary relationship between the federal
Crown and the aboriginal peoples of Canada: Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2
S.C.R. 335. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that not every aspect of the
relationship between fiduciary and beneficiary takes the form of a fiduciary
obligation: Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. [1989] 2
S.C.R. 574. The nature of the relationship between the parties defines the scope,
and the limits, of the duties that will be imposed. The courts must be careful not to
compromise the independence of quasi-judicial tribunals and decision-making
agencies by imposing upon them fiduciary obligations which require that their
decisions be made in accordance with a fiduciary duty.clxxxix
Given that the nature of the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the federal
government defines the scope of the fiduciary obligations, the obligations can vary as the
relationship varies. Thus, while the federal government owes fiduciary obligations to the Indian,
Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada as a consequence of, for example, the recognition and
affirmation of their Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the
government's relationship with each those peoples is not same. Although section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 includes Indians, Inuit and, probably, Métis people,cxc the Indian Act
applies only to Indians who are registered or entitled to be registered under that statute. The
Indian Act creates a special statutory relationship, entailing fiduciary obligations, between the
federal government and the Indians to whom it applies. Those obligations are not necessarily the
same as those owed to Aboriginal peoples who are outside the scope of the Act. To give another
example, some Aboriginal peoples have signed treaties or land claims agreements with the
Crown, while others have not. These treaties and agreements altered the relationships that existed
between the Aboriginal parties and the Crown before they were signed. The Crown therefore
owes obligations to the Aboriginal signatories that are no doubt different from the obligations it

owes Aboriginal peoples who have never signed treaties or agreements. Moreover, the Crown's
obligations under treaties and agreements vary.
To determine the nature and extent of the federal government's fiduciary obligations to
Aboriginal peoples in Quebec, one therefore must make a distinction between obligations that
apply to all Aboriginal peoples throughout Canada and those that are either regional or distinct to
certain Aboriginal peoples. As discussed earlier, the federal government has constitutional
responsibility for the Aboriginal peoples of Canada (or at least Indian peoples and Inuit) under
section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.cxci It also has a general obligation under section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to respect and protect Aboriginal and treaty rights.cxcii The
nature of those rights may vary from one Aboriginal people to another, but the general obligation
applies to all. The federal government therefore has constitutional obligations to respect and
protect any Aboriginal and treaty rights, including rights under land claims agreements,cxciii that
Aboriginal peoples in Quebec have.
Earlier we discussed the fiduciary obligations arising under selected treaties with the
Aboriginal peoples of Quebec and under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the
Northeastern Quebec Agreement. We also discussed several documents that apply regionally,
including the Capitulation of Montreal, the Royal Proclamation of 1763,cxciv the Rupert's Land
Order, and the Quebec boundaries acts of 1898 and 1912. The scope and nature of the fiduciary
obligations under those documents need not be reiterated here. Nor is it necessary for purposes of
this paper to describe in detail all the possible fiduciary obligations owed to the various
Aboriginal peoples in Quebec. Our task instead is to determine the nature of the federal
government's fiduciary obligations in the context of accession to sovereignty by Quebec. We
address that issue in the next part.
PART III
Fiduciary Obligations in the Context
of Accession to Sovereignty by Quebec
Implications for Domestic Law (Dupuis)
In this section, we examine the rules of Canadian law that govern the concept of fiduciary
obligations in the context of accession to sovereignty by Quebec. Quebec is the only Canadian
province whose government advocates a form of sovereignty for the province. This was one of
the key planks in the platform of the Parti québécois when it was first elected in 1973 for two

successive terms. It came to power again in the autumn of 1994.
If the occasion arose, our analysis could apply to any other Canadian province, albeit
adjusted to take into account, for example, the historical sources unique to each province. The
concept of the federal Crown's fiduciary obligations is recognized in Canadian law as applying in
all of Canada.
Referendum on Quebec sovereignty (Dupuis)
We turn first to the issue of the Crown's fiduciary obligations in the context of a
provincial referendum on sovereignty in Quebec. Such a referendum would be held within the
existing Canadian constitutional framework, that is, with the current constitutional division of
powers between the provinces and the federal government. In this context, the referendum would
occur in Quebec under its current status as a Canadian province. The purpose of the referendum
would be to determine whether the people of Quebec wanted Quebec to remain a Canadian
province or to become sovereign, outside the Canadian legal framework.
We will not consider here whether the existing Canadian constitution recognizes
Aboriginal government as a third order of government in addition to federal and provincial
governments, an issue that is beyond the scope of this study.
The present government of Quebec has decided to hold a referendum on the question of
sovereignty. One referendum on sovereignty-association was already held by the Parti Québécois
government in 1980. When re-elected in the fall of 1994, the PQ decided to consult the people of
Quebec again and, in December 1994, tabled draft legislation on sovereignty on which it intends
to ask them to vote in a referendum. The exact timing of the referendum has not yet been
determined but the premier of Quebec, Jacques Parizeau, has indicated that he intends to consult
the people in 1995.
Section 1 of the draft bill on Quebec sovereignty states that Quebec is a sovereign
country. Section 2 provides for the possibility of maintaining an economic association between
Quebec and Canada.
Section 3 refers explicitly to Aboriginal peoples. It focuses on the future Quebec
constitution and contains a number of provisions, including constitutional recognition of the right
of self-government of Aboriginal nations on lands to which they have full ownership. The bill
states that such recognition will be exercised in a manner consistent with the territorial integrity

of Quebec.
Section 7 states that Quebec will assume the obligations and enjoy the rights arising out
of the treaties to which Canada is a party and the international conventions to which Canada is a
signatory, in accordance with the rules of international law.
Section 10 provides for the continuity of federal laws and regulations that apply in
Quebec until amended or repealed by a Quebec statute.
The government also set up provincial and regional consultative commissions to inform
and consult the people on all aspects of this issue. These commissions held public hearings in
February and March 1995 and reported to the government. Indian peoples and Inuit in Quebec
made public their opposition to the draft legislation and to the government's approach and
received considerable media coverage as a result. Some First Nations, including the Crees and
the Montagnais, have held public hearings and are considering holding a parallel referendum.
In connection with the process to consult the people, does the federal government have a
special role to play with respect to the Aboriginal peoples with whom it has a fiduciary
relationship? If so, would a specific fiduciary obligation result?
Quebec has chosen to hold the referendum under the general referendum legislation
already in place.cxcv Under this law, a consultative referendum is instigated by the government,
which must submit the referendum question to a vote in the National Assembly. The 1980
referendum on sovereignty-association, held by the government of Quebec under the leadership
of Premier René Lévesque, was conducted under this law.
For referendum purposes, the electoral constituencies include reserves and other Indian
settlements and Inuit villages. Aboriginal communities do not constitute distinct constituencies;
they are included in larger constituencies. In the territory covered by the James Bay and Northern
Quebec Agreement, the Aboriginal peoples (Crees and Inuit) account for a large number of
voters, but this is the only part of Quebec where this is the case. The referendum legislation also
provides for the use of Aboriginal languages on ballot papers.
In this way, the Quebec law ensures that the members of the various Aboriginal peoples
of the province can participate as individuals in a referendum process; this is in keeping with the
spirit of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
As individuals, Aboriginal people can thus rely on the provisions of this law ─ to the
extent that they wish to take part in any or all stages of a provincial referendum on the possible

sovereignty of Quebec ─ which ensures that they have the right to information, the right to join
committees, freedom of speech and the right to vote. As a result, Aboriginal people have, as
individuals, the right to express their opinion in a possible referendum. Indeed some of them did
so in 1980.cxcvi However, the individual rights of Aboriginal people do not necessarily coincide
with their collective rights as peoples. The distinction between these individual rights and the
collective rights of Aboriginal peoples is particularly important in relation to fiduciary
obligations.
What becomes of their collective rights during such a process? Do they have collective
rights that bring into play the federal government's obligations to them? Does the federal
government have a particular role to play in such a process in this respect?
We saw earlier that there is a fiduciary relationship between the federal Crown and
Aboriginal peoples, as collectivities, and that in certain situations this relationship results in
fiduciary obligations for the federal Crown. It can be said that the federal government has no
specific responsibility to individual Aboriginal people with respect to the exercise of their rights
in a referendum. However, we believe that the federal government's responsibility to Aboriginal
peoples collectively means that it must ensure that the views and concerns of Aboriginal peoples
with respect to the effects of such a referendum are made known to the population. Of course the
federal government cannot compel Aboriginal people to participate in the province's consultative
process. That is their decision. The federal government must, however, assure the protection of
constitutional Aboriginal and treaty rights. While it might be said that the process in itself does
not infringe on those rights, the process nonetheless represents a step toward a major legal and
political change in Canada ─ the sovereignty of Quebec.
The government of Canada could take various steps to comply with its fiduciary
obligations to Aboriginal peoples. It could provide resources for Aboriginal people to argue their
point of view during this process. The government of Canada could take steps to raise public
awareness of the possible effects of Quebec sovereignty on the rights of Aboriginal peoples. It
could inform the people of Canada of the federal government's duty to protect the rights of
Aboriginal peoples as a result of its fiduciary obligations, that it intends to honour this duty, and
that this duty will remain, whatever the result of the referendum.

Negotiations concerning Quebec sovereignty (Dupuis)
In this section, we examine what would occur if the governments of Canada and Quebec
agreed to negotiate sovereignty for Quebec. The negotiations would take place in the current
Canadian constitutional framework and would take the form of bilateral negotiations between the
federal government and the government of Quebec. This would not be a constitutional process,
which requires the participation and support of the provinces under the constitutional amendment
formula and the participation of Aboriginal people under section 35.1 of the Constitution Act,
1982. These negotiations would be a separate and preliminary process to any constitutional
process on this subject. Any agreement on the sovereignty of Quebec flowing from this
preliminary bilateral process would have to be formalized as a constitutional amendment at a
later date.
We assume that both governments would have agreed that the negotiations would be
designed to change the Canadian constitutional framework. In this situation, the two
governments might or might not have reached consensus on the ultimate establishment of two
separate states. Issues concerning Aboriginal peoples would be only one of the many items on
the agenda for these negotiations.
Would such a negotiating process between the government of Canada and the
government of Quebec give rise in itself to a fiduciary obligation? It is necessary to distinguish
between the process itself and the fundamental issues considered during the negotiating process.
In the existing constitutional framework, the federal government is primarily responsible
for acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to Aboriginal peoples. It would retain this
responsibility in any negotiations with Quebec concerning its possible attainment of sovereignty.
Federal constitutional jurisdiction (under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867) over
Indian peoples (and Inuit and perhaps Métis people) and the lands reserved for them would, for
example, require the federal government to defend the interests of Aboriginal peoples with
respect to lands reserved for them.
Furthermore, the federal government would be responsible for ensuring respect for the
Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples (Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples) protected
by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Recall that rights created by land claims
agreements such as the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement are considered treaty rights

under section 35(3) and accordingly are protected by that section.
The federal government would therefore have to assume this obligation in its negotiations
with Quebec. In this regard, it would first have to consult Aboriginal peoples in Quebec. Even if
the Sparrow test developed by the Supreme Court of Canada (concerning the factors to consider
when analyzing the rationale for a statute that infringes a protected constitutional right) does not
apply in this instance, it can be argued by analogy that the federal government would have an
obligation to consult Aboriginal peoples in Quebec on the arrangements being negotiated
between Canada and Quebec.
In other respects, Canada's current legal system does not give Aboriginal peoples the
right to participate directly in such negotiations, whether as parties to the proceedings, observers
of the negotiations or signatories of any agreement that might result. The governments of Canada
and Quebec do not have a legal obligation to ensure that Aboriginal peoples play a direct part in
such preliminary negotiations preceding the constitutional process that would eventually follow
an agreement between Canada and Quebec.
Although the law does not impose an obligation on governments to ensure that
Aboriginal peoples participate directly in negotiations, the legitimacy of such an approach could
be called into question. The constitution provides specifically for the participation of Aboriginal
peoples in constitutional discussions on issues affecting them directly. In addition, Aboriginal
peoples were invited to participate in the comprehensive constitutional negotiations that followed
the rejection of the Meech Lake Accord and that led to adoption of the Charlottetown Accord in
1992. Although the Charlottetown Accord was not ultimately approved, the negotiations dealt
with numerous aspects of Canadian federalism that went far beyond Aboriginal issues.
Aboriginal peoples were not allowed to participate, however, in constitutional negotiations
leading to the Meech Lake Accord; it is therefore too early to say whether their participation in
the Charlottetown process established a precedent that will lead at some point to a constitutional
convention assuring the participation of Aboriginal peoples in any constitutional process ─ or
whether their participation was merely a reaction to the problems generated by the Meech Lake
process.
However, as any agreement resulting from such negotiations, to have legal effect, would
require constitutional amendments that would have an impact on section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 and sections 25, 35 and 35.1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the federal and

provincial governments would probably be bound, under section 35.1, by the commitment in
principle to convene a constitutional conference in which Aboriginal representatives were invited
to participate. This requirement results not from fiduciary obligations but from the constitutional
guarantee of participation in section 35.1 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In addition to this
constitutional requirement, the federal government probably has a fiduciary obligation to ensure
that Aboriginal peoples participate in any constitutional discussions held following an agreement
between the governments of Canada and Quebec on the sovereignty of Quebec, bearing in mind
the effects of such an agreement on their Aboriginal and treaty rights.cxcvii
Thus, governments have no legal obligation to ensure that Aboriginal peoples participate
directly in bilateral negotiations between the governments of Canada and Quebec preceding any
constitutional process leading eventually to sovereignty. Instead, considerations of legitimacy or
political advisability would come into play.
If Aboriginal peoples do not participate directly in the negotiations, they could attempt to
have the courts set aside an agreement that they thought was contrary to the federal government's
fiduciary obligations. They would then have to establish that such an agreement concerned a
situation involving a fiduciary obligation on the part of the federal government and that the
federal government had contravened this obligation by signing the agreement in question. The
courts would then have to render a decision on whether the federal government had fulfilled its
fiduciary obligations in the negotiations.
One can imagine numerous scenarios for the contents of such an agreement. The
agreement might or might not include a section on the Crown's fiduciary obligations. If there
were such a section, it could, for example, provide for fiduciary obligations to be transferred to
Quebec in the form they had at the time of the transfer. Or, the agreement might require the
parties to agree that Quebec would amend its legal system to include fiduciary obligations with
respect to Aboriginal peoples equivalent to the present fiduciary obligations of the federal
Crown. The agreement could also make provision for the courts to rule on the transition or
transfer of the federal Crown's fiduciary obligations to Quebec.
Like all subjects under negotiation, this issue can give rise to all kinds of speculation. Nor
should it be forgotten that Aboriginal issues would be only one component among many being
negotiated. It is thus difficult to assess in the abstract the relative weight, in the specific
circumstances of such negotiations, of Aboriginal issues compared with issues like defence or

currency.
Unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec (McNeil)
If a negotiated agreement could not be reached between Quebec and Canada, Quebec
might choose to act on its own and issue a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). As the
Canadian constitution does not allow for secession by a province, a UDI would have no force or
effect in Canadian law.cxcviii In the absence of recognition by Canada of Quebec's independence,
from the perspective of Canadian constitutional law (though not necessarily from the perspective
of Quebec lawcxcix) Quebec would still be part of Canada. As a result, in Canadian law the federal
government's responsibilities and authority in Quebec would continue.cc
As long as Canada did not recognize Quebec as independent and continued to assert its
legitimate authority,cci that state of affairs would persist. Canadian courts would probably be
bound to accept the federal government's position that Quebec was still part of Canadaccii and
would have to declare unlawful any acts of the Quebec government that were inconsistent with
that position. Although the Quebec government might eventually gain legitimacy through
international recognition, in the face of Canadian opposition and opposition from Aboriginal
peoples in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada, that recognition would not necessarily be
forthcoming. But in any case, Canadian courts would probably be bound to continue to apply
Canadian constitutional law to Quebec as long as Canada refused to recognize Quebec's
independence.cciii
In our discussion of the sources and nature of the fiduciary obligations, we concluded that
the government of Canada has constitutionally-enforceable fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal
peoples in Quebec. Those obligations will remain as long as the federal government continues to
assert jurisdiction over Quebec and will be enforceable in Canadian courts. But even more
important in the context of a UDI by Quebec, the fiduciary obligations require Canada to maintain
its relationship with Aboriginal peoples in Quebec for as long as necessary to protect their
interests. The government of Canada has constitutional responsibility for Aboriginal peoples and
cannot renounce that responsibility unilaterally.cciv If Aboriginal peoples do not accept Quebec
independence, the government of Canada has a constitutional obligation to ensure that their
interests are protected in face of a UDI.ccv

Canada's obligations to Aboriginal peoples in Quebec in the event of a UDI would include
a duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples both inside and outside Quebecccvi to ascertain their
views in that context.ccvii The Canadian government would be obliged to take their views into
account and to give top priority to the protection of their Aboriginal and treaty rights. ccviii As we
have seen, at present those rights are constitutionally protected by section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982.ccix That protection can be removed only by a constitutional amendment ─
requiring the authorization of Parliament and the legislatures of at least two-thirds of the
provinces with at least 50 per cent of the population of all the provinces ─ made after a
constitutional conference to which representatives of the Aboriginal peoples would have to be
invited.ccx After Quebec independence, that protection would disappear. Even if Quebec included
protections of Aboriginal and treaty rights in its new constitution, those protections could be
removed by Quebec at any time in accordance with that constitution's amending formula.
Canada would therefore be constitutionally obliged to take appropriate action to protect
Aboriginal and treaty rights in the event of a UDI. Canada could do this in several ways: (1) by
issuing a declaration that Quebec is still part of Canada, thereby denying recognition of Quebec
as an independent state; (2) by lobbying the international community to deny recognition to
Quebec; (3) by instructing federal employees, both inside and outside Quebec, to disregard a
UDI;
UDI

(4) by applying to the Supreme Court of Canada by way of reference for an opinion that a

is unconstitutional and in violation of the Aboriginal and treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples,

in Quebec and elsewhere; (5) by resorting to whatever other measures the federal government
deemed necessary in the circumstances. While the federal government would have discretion to
choose actions it regarded as appropriate, those actions would have to be adequate to protect the
rights of Aboriginal peoples. In the event that the federal government neglected or refused to take
adequate actions, Aboriginal peoples could go to Canadian courts to seek legal sanctions against
the government for breach of its constitutional obligations.

CONCLUSIONS (Dupuis/McNeil)
Our study has led us to identify a number of conclusions regarding the fiduciary
obligations of the Canadian Crown in the context of accession to sovereignty by Quebec:
1. Recognition in Canadian law of fiduciary relationships between the federal
government and the Aboriginal peoples of Canada based on their historical relationships
is a recently recognized but now established fact.
2. These fiduciary relationships can, under certain circumstances, give rise to fiduciary
obligations sui generis on the part of the federal Crown to Aboriginal peoples.
3. The recent recognition of the existence of fiduciary relationships and resulting
fiduciary obligations is a major departure from the courts' previous interpretation of the
responsibilities of the Crown to Aboriginal peoples.
4. This major departure involves a thorough reconsideration of the historical facts and
their legal consequences in terms of this new legal reality.
5. Although this has not been established so far, the fiduciary obligations probably also
apply, in certain circumstances, to provincial Crowns.
6. The fiduciary obligations impose limits on the exercise of legislative and executive
powers.
7. The fiduciary obligations are enforceable in law. Aboriginal peoples can apply to the
courts and obtain redress when they can prove that the Crown has not fulfilled its
fiduciary obligations.
8. There are various sources of the fiduciary obligations, which may flow from unilateral
actions such as legislation, or from bilateral actions such as treaties signed with Indian
peoples.
9. The federal Crown's fiduciary obligations are by their nature uniform throughout
Canada. However, the extent and scope of the obligations vary because of the diversity of
their sources.
10. The fiduciary obligations exist under the present Canadian constitutional regime.
11. The federal government must assume its fiduciary responsibility in relation to
Aboriginal peoples in the context of a referendum concerning the accession of Quebec to
sovereignty.

12. The federal government should also assume its fiduciary responsibility in relation to
Aboriginal peoples in the context of possible negotiations concerning the accession of
Quebec to sovereignty.
13. Assuming that an agreement would result from such negotiations and that this
agreement would have an impact on section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 or
sections 25, 35 and 35.1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the federal government should
then hold a constitutional conference in which the Aboriginal peoples of Canada should
be invited to participate. A failure to comply with this obligation would probably violate
section 35.1 and call into question the fiduciary obligations of the federal Crown to
Aboriginal peoples. In addition, the agreement itself might call those obligations into
question.
14. In the event of a unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec, irrespective of the
position in Quebec law, in Canadian law the federal government's fiduciary obligations to
Aboriginal peoples in Quebec would continue for as long as Canada did not recognize
Quebec's independence and continued to assert its legitimate authority. These obligations
would require Canada to take appropriate action to ensure that the rights of Aboriginal
peoples in Quebec, in particular their Aboriginal and treaty rights, were protected.
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